ticular, I wish here to compare and contrast Hume and Cavell along two axes central to each of their thoughts about skepticism: (1) the naturalness (and unnaturalness) of skeptical doubt and (2) the recovery or attainment of the ordinary in the wake of skeptical doubt. One might regard these as, respectively, moments of loss and return.
Let's begin with the loss, the naturalness of loss, one might say the loss of naturalism.
1. Skeptical Doubt as Natural. One of the dimensions of human life that Hume finds impresses itself on us in unbidden ways is skepticism. Michael Williams has argued that in the context of ordinary language skeptical doubts are "unnatural" and not compelling, without a means of getting off the ground, or as Cavell might put it, without a way to respond to a "reasonable" question. 4 But both Cavell and Hume -in what I think is a crucial similarity between them and one that aligns them against many of the critiques of skepticism that interpret it as mere confusion -regard the rise of skeptical doubts, as in a fashion, natural. Hume writes that "sceptical doubt arises naturally" 5 and that it, "both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cur'd" (T 1.4.2.57, SBN 218). play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three of four hour's amusement I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther" (T 1.4.7.9, SBN 269) -an account, I think, fairly described as portraying the meaningless and not-compelling quality (if not exactly unintelligibility) of skeptical inquiry. Hume similarly also renders the scene of skeptical inquiry as of a different "sphere," other to what he terms "common life" (T 1.4.7.13, SBN 271). Hume, of course, declares that in opposition to extreme forms of skeptical doubt: "I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people" (T 1.4.7.10, SBN 269) in the contexts of common life. Though in a sense skeptical doubt is a malady that cannot be cured, Hume calls upon the traditionally therapeutic effects of "nature," which "suffices to that purpose [i.e., of dispelling doubt], and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium" (T 1.4.7.9, SBN 269). It is just this sense of nature as a therapeutic defeater of skeptical doubt, in the face of which skepticism is in Strawson's characterization "powerless" and unintelligible, that has led so many important interpreters to read Hume as anti-skeptical and a realist. 6 But there is a countervailing demand of nature, not so commonly quoted, that There is something, according to Hume, natural in the sense of being necessary as well as unbidden about this sort of reflection for him: "even suppose […] curiosity and ambition shou'd not transport me into speculations without the sphere of common life, it wou'd necessarily happen…", since "'tis almost impossible for the mind of man to rest, like those of beasts, in that narrow circle of objects which are the subject of daily conversation and action" (T 1.4.7.13, SBN 271). Moreover, as the trajectory of 6. Norman Kemp Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume," Mind N.S. 14 ( Hume appreciates, as Cavell does, that there is nothing more human than the refusal or the wish to transcend or the impulse to speculate beyond the diurnal, the everyday, the ordinary and common; and indeed it stands prominently among Cavell's criticisms of recent philosophical critiques of skepticism that, unlike those of early modern philosophers, they do not take the naturalness of skepticism seriously.
Cavell affirms the naturalness of the loss he wishes to redress, the denial he wishes to confront, the reasonableness of skeptical questions about our best cases, and the feeling of a kind separateness or alienation from others and the world:
But when the experience created by such thought is there, it is something that presents itself to me as one, as I have wished to express it, of being sealed off from the world, enclosed within my own endless succession of experiences. It is an experience for which there must be a psychological explanation; but no such explanation would or should prove its epistemological insignificance. And I know of no philosophical criticism which proves it either. (CR 144)
The moral [i.e. that "I can never know"] is a natural, inevitable extension of the conclusion drawn [i.e. that "in this best case I don't know"] […]. The step from the conclusion about this object to the moral about knowledge as a whole is irresistible. It is no step at all. The world drops out.
[…] What "best case" turns out to mean can be expressed in a major premiss: If I know anything, I know
this. (CR 145-46)
The irresistible extension of skepticism has produced a sense of being sealed off and of being able only to look at the world from the outside (an idea implicit in philosophers sceptically speaking about an "external" world) that has "become […] natural" to us. Cavell finds the modern mind exploring it in film, as if we have come to view the world on a cinematic screen in the perceptual theaters of our minds: "Our condition has become one in which our natural mode of perception is to view, feeling un- Cavell carries on in this passage discussing the depths to which cinema exhibits our skeptical despair (anticipating his 1981 Pursuits of Happiness): "It is our fantasies, now all but completely thwarted and out of hand, which are unseen and must be kept unseen. As if we could no longer hope that anyone might share them -at just the moment that they are pouring into the streets, less private than ever. So we are less than ever in a position to marry them to the world." 9. Of course, Cavell's example here, as well as others in the CR are only in qualified ways properly understood as skeptical propositions, since skepticism, understood in both the Pyrrhonian and Academic traditions, does not advance truth-claims, even negative truth claims. Without qualification, these conclusions are not skeptical but negative dogmatic assertions, or perhaps argumentative gambits meant to balance against contrary dogmatic claims (e.g., that "we do know the existence of objects"). That there may be possible modes of assertion consistent with skepticism (forms of assent, approval, yielding, living according to appearance, etc.) is a controversy Cavell elides here. And so we might understand his analysis to be limited to a specific understanding of skepticism -e.g. skepticism of the sort expressed in Descartes's "Meditation I." 11. On "hinge" propositions see Wittgenstein's On Certainty: "the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
[…] That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. Appeal to shared criteria can be disappointing, as it offers no "proof" of a scientific or deductive sort for the reality of, say, others' minds and their pain; and in 12. The idea of "denial" here may be inconsistent with classical forms of Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism, too. I think other formulations, however, commonly accepted or, better, enlisted by skeptics remain consistent with Cavell's point -formulations, for example, such as "destabilizing" criteria, subjecting criteria to skeptical "epochē" or "suspension" or "doubt."
13. If writing in unqualified ways about skeptical conclusions distances Cavell from ancient skepticism, acknowledging the openness of criteria may be a way to align Cavell's thought with it, at least that of the ancient Pyrrhonians, who advocated adopting a posture of being "zetetic" or open. Zetetic openness is, according to Sextus Empiricus (fl. late 2nd century), one of the characteristic ways Pyrrhonian skeptics practice skepticism. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in Sextus Empiricus, edited and translated by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 1.3.7 [Book 1, Chapter 3, line 7]: "The Sceptic School, then is also called 'Zetetic' from its activity in investigation and inquiry." Hereafter, "PH."
14. "If C. L. Barber is right […] in finding that the point of comedy is to put society back in touch with nature, then this is one ground on which comedy and tragedy stand together […] . The tragedy is that comedy has its limits. This is part of the sadness within comedy; the emptiness after a long laugh. Join hands here as we may, one of the hands is mine, the other yours"; from "The Avoidance this disappointment there are "natural" reasons for finding the appeals OLP (ordinary language philosophy) makes empty and the universality of its voice a sham (CR 90). We may, in fact, wish it to be so. It is insufficient, therefore, and even dangerous on Cavell's account to demand a philosophical conclusion that will purge the scene of skepticism -under the false pretense that skeptical doubts are unnatural, that reason is always local, that the epistemologists' context is a false or "non-claim" context, that language includes indubitable "hinge" or "framework" propositions to settle our (1962) . Reid writes: "qualities must necessarily be in something that is figured, coloured, hard or soft, that moves or resists. It is not to these qualities, but to that which is the subject of them, that we give the name body. If any man should think fit to deny that these things are qualities, or that they require any subject, I leave him to enjoy his opinion as a man who denies first principles, and is not fit to be reasoned with"; Reid (1785), 18: Essay 1, Chapter 2, "Principles Taken For Granted." And Reid appeals to nature, too -but not, as Hume does, to the natural relations among ideas; rather for Reid, the appeal is to a natural relation between words and things: "That without a natural knowledge of the connection between these [natural] signs and the things signified by them, language could never have been cartes's and Locke's "Way of Ideas," an approach to experience ultimately rooted in Gassendi and the atomist tradition, 17 skepticism is a natural, even logical, result: "for all the glory of transcendental idealism, it still requires that things in themselves drop out of the picture (to this gift from Kant Cavell has replied: 'thanks for nothing')." 18 Early modern representationalism, according to this kind of OLP criticism, prejudges and distorts our relationship to the world and to others by establishing from the outset a metaphysical "gap," a "lack" that is purportedly always already present and can never be overcome. If one's starting point is that human beings perceive only perceptions, rather than external objects, one will never reach others and the external world -and Cavell wishes to reach others and the world, to restore ourselves to the world and to the community we have always already inhabited (where else could we be?). Cavell writes in "An Emerson Mood," seeming to balance or oscillate among individual, collective, and universal voices 19 -ordinary language philosophers', his, everyone's: "What the ordinary language philosopher is feeling -but I mean to speak just for myself in this -is that our relation to the world's existence is somehow closer than the ideas of believing and knowing are made to convey" -especially ideas of believing and "knowing" This New Yet Unapproachable America: "Austin's and Wittgenstein's attacks on philosophy, and on skepticism in particular -in appealing to what they call the ordinary or everyday use of words -are counting on some intimacy between language and world that they were never able satisfactorily to give an account of." 21 Hannah Arendt points out in "On Humanity in Dark Times" that in some contexts the very stating of something is meaningful only because what is named has been denied or is in question. 22 So, for example, in the U.S. Civil Rights movement, it was meaningful for African Americans to proclaim, "I am a man!" precisely because that standing had been denied or problematized. That Cavell names the "ordinary"
and Hume "common life," similarly, is meaningful because both philosophers have found it to have become lost or threatened or refused and wish to recover it so as achieve what Cavell calls, in "The Uncanniness of the Everyday," a "resettlement" (QO 176). Cavell sets before himself, then, the labor not only of exploring, interrogating, but also in some fashion of restoring the intimacy between inquirers (the meaning of the Greek skeptikoi) and the world as well as each other, rectifying a kind of loss at the hands of epistemology he, like Hume, confronts -a special kind of alienation expressed in terms of modern skepticism. Cavell writes, as if in response to a commonly imagined Hume: "I understand ordinary language philosophy not as an effort to reinstate vulgar beliefs, or common sense, to a pre-scientific position of eminear is one of the inflections he gives to the common, the low, as in the passage from Nature beginning: 'I ask not for the great, the remotes, the romantic… I embrace the common, I explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low. Give me insight into today, and you may have the antique and future worlds. ' nence, but to reclaim the human self from its denial and neglect by modern philosophy […] . My hopes are to suggest an answer in the arena of traditional philosophical skepticism, and to suggest that the Wittgensteinian view of language (together with an Austinian practice of it), and of philosophy, is an assault upon that denial" (CR 154). 23 But Hume does not just aspire to reinstating "vulgar" pre-philosophical beliefs.
In his 1779 Dialogues concerning Natural Religion he writes (in the voice of Philo) that "if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects" -even though we may wish to forget skepticism's lessons. 24 It is central to Hume's thought that our response to loss of a skeptical kind may be well or poorly considered, perhaps we might say less or more forgetful. 25 25. Writing about the importance of not forgetting the lessons of skepticism while also acknowledging the inevitability of that "fault," Hume cautions his readers about his reluctant and occasional slipping into dogmatic forms of expression: "On such an occasion we are apt not only to forget our scepticism, but even our modesty too; and make use of such terms as these, 'tis evident, 'tis certain, 'tis undeniable; which a due deference to the public ought, perhaps, to prevent. I may have fallen into this fault after the example of others; but I here enter a caveat against any objections, which may be offer'd on that head; and declare that such expressions were extorted from me by the present view of the object, and imply no dogmatical spirit, nor conceited idea of my own judgment, which are sentiments that I am sensible can become no body, and a sceptic still less than any other" (T 1.4.7.15, SBN 273-74). Might Hume have been alluding in this important reference to not forgetting at the closing of Book 1 of the Treatise to the way Sextus Empiricus describes skeptics' non-dogmatic use of language as a form skeptical "recollection" (hypomnema), the remembering only of appearances (e.g. PH 2.10.102). In this Sextus may be contrasting skepticism, perhaps in an ironic way, with Plato's description of dogmatic knowing as recollection (anamnesis). Plato himself, in a passage that fascinates Derrida, contrasts anamnesis unfavorably with mere hypomnema; see Plato, Phaedrus (275a), and Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," Tel Quel 32 & 33 (1968): 18-59. reflective return to the natural and customary common life (nature and custom being the Pyrrhonian guide or "criterion" for skeptical practice). 26 Returning to common life for Hume, however, is not just surrender to what cannot be resisted; common life for Hume is to be "methodized and corrected" 27 in light of skepticism on the basis of reflectively generated standards (e.g., "general rules" of a "second influence"; T 1.3.13.12, SBN 149-50). Hume's "blind submission" (T 1.4.7.10, SBN 269), therefore, is less blind than his well known remark suggests and shelters within itself an acknowledgment (though not quite a transcendental argument) that the press of the natural in common life constitutes the very condition of the possibility of thinking, acting, and meaning. It underwrites the "legitimate ground of assent," 28 the "title" for reason's authority (T 1.4.7.11, SBN 270), since reason cannot establish its own warrant, even the warrant or "authority" of skeptical arguments themselves (T 1.4.1.12, SBN 186-87). 29 Strawson is struck, along just these lines, by Hume's recognition that "'tis vain to ask Whether there be body or not? That is a point we must take for granted in all our reasonings" (T 1.4.2.1, SBN 187), concluding from this that Hume understands natural beliefs to be basic to the "framework" of any possible epistemological investigation and therefore immune to skepticism. 30 Hume for Strawson is schizophrenic; the skeptical 26. Sextus Empiricus, whom Hume will largely follow in this, describes the Pyrrhonian "fourfold" criterion for life this way: "Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature's guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically" (PH 1.11.23-24). 33. Richard Fleming, First Word Philosophy: "It is with the existence of criteria that ordinary metaphysical reminders can begin and with them that we find not madness but silence, the silent harmony that makes possible all that we do" (32) , "A silent harmony of humans and the world stands firm amidst our talk and action" (33).
34. In the essay, "Makavejev on Bergman," Cavell illustrates his understanding of the role nature plays in the formation of meaning when he compares directors as if he were comparing (1) poorly educated realists and skeptics against (2) his own OLP way of discernment: "The former [1] seek to fix or to flout significance, perhaps to suggest that significance is necessarily private or public or arbitrary or infinite or nonexistent. The latter [2] propose significance as the intersection of nature and history, as a task of continuous and unfolding interpretations, each felt as complete and each making possible the next, until a human form of life fits together"; TOS 117. If the first step in what Cavell calls philosophy as "education for grownups" is to take inventory of our estrangement from ourselves, the "second step is to grasp the true necessity of human strangeness as such," and with it "the opportunity for outwardness" (SW 55). We are separate but not, however, for Cavell, as for Derrida, always and already totally "other" to one another (radically and metaphysically alien), lacking the capacity really to know, or understand, or really to commune with one another. We can already acknowledge our being separate but not totally "other" because worries about separation would not themselves be possible without human beings already sharing a meaningful language and human criteria. Separateness, therefore, does not entail absolute difference but rather the necessity of outward expression and the need to read it.
Cavell's appeal to shared criteria and natural agreement may seem analogous to Strawson's appeal to our epistemological background "framework," but the Cavellian gesture differs from Strawson's because it does not aspire to purge human life or inquiry of skeptical doubt. Fear of separateness and the confrontation with separateness to which philosophy brings us may account for the human wish to flee, but to 36. Cavell here quoting from henry David Thoreau's Walden (1854). The phrase "an intimacy of difference" appears in Cavell's essay, "Knowledge as Transgression," on Frank Capra's 1934 film, It Happened One Night; PoH 103.
37. I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for the following thought along these lines: "The danger of reading Cavell on skepticism is the propensity for his views on what accounts for skepticism, what 'living it' entails, to be misconstrued. […] Where it is often thought that we get into trouble by failing to accept our finitude, […] accepting our finitude is not to put an end to skepticism -but to acknowledge it in a certain way, in a sense, to cohabitate with a fair amount of fear and trembling, and dread, for life." Why that is so stands for me still as a persistent question -why the difficulty of that acceptance, why we both wish for and flee exposure and intimacy, why they remain for us both among the grounds of our epistemological and moral demands as well as a cause for profound anxiety and dread. The answer is, as I am inclined to argue, just the terms of our natural separateness and finitude -the human fate skeptical philosophy acknowledges. Speaking together face to face can seem to deny that distance, to deny that facing one another requires acknowledging the presence of the other, revealing our positions, betraying them if need be. But to deny such things is to deny our separateness. And that makes us fictions of one another. (SW 65) Denying the separateness of our finitude deepens it and totalizes it in the same way Derrida, despite his pretensions to the contrary, extends rather than subverts the early modern metaphysical condition. As Cavell puts it: "The necessity of the task is the choice of finitude, which for us (even after God) means the acknowledgment of the existence of finite others, which is to say the choice of community, of autonomous moral existence" (CR 464). 38 Both Cavell and Hume then find skeptical doubt to be natural; and they both appeal to what they find, what impresses itself, as natural dimensions of human existence in order to recover the ordinary (in Cavell) or common life (in Hume). Neither philosopher, however, thinks that skepticism can be completely overcome or purged or resolved, even by the natural. For Cavell, the potential for skeptical doubts is intrinsic to the very criteria that make human language, thought, and action possible.
That is, the very conditions for the possibility of meaning make meaning vulnerable to skepticism. Sustaining meaning requires ongoing expression, re-reading, and reagreement. For Hume, the natural impulse to epistemological thinking and the natural trajectory of epistemological thinking are toward skepticism. Natural relations of ideas provide the "cement of the universe," but those relations are unsponsored and contingent, always subject to potential rupture. Since neither reason nor the senses can refute skeptical doubt, human beings must accept an ongoing fragility and openness to their inquiries as well as the potential for doubt. That Cavell and Hume reach 38. I am grateful to Dr. Chiara Alfano for the helpful suggestions she has offered me on Cavell, skepticism, naturalism, and separateness. such similar conclusions through such different philosophical approaches not only enriches an understanding of the dynamics of skeptical thinking. It may also point to something of the "truth of skepticism."
